Article 6. Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
Objection 1. It would seem that
prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since
prudence is in the reason, while moral
virtue is in the
appetite, it seems that
prudence stands in relation to moral
virtue, as reason to the
appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the
appetitive power. Therefore
prudence appoints the end to the moral
virtues.
Objection 2. Further,
man surpasses irrational beings by his
reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of
man are in relation to his
reason, what
man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now
man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of
man are directed to reason as to their end. But
prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (
Article 2). Therefore all actions are directed to
prudence as their end. Therefore
prudence appoints the end to all moral
virtues.
Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the
virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the
virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now
prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
On the contrary, The
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the
intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to
prudence to appoint the end to moral
virtues, but only to regulate the means.
I answer that, The end of moral
virtues is
human good. Now the
good of the
human soul is to be in accord with reason, as
Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral
virtue must of
necessity pre-
exist in the reason. Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of which we obtain
knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-
exist, as
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral
virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; I-II, 13, 3); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is
prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to
prudence to appoint the end to moral
virtues, but only to regulate the means.
Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason
known by the name of
"synderesis" appoints the end to moral
virtues, as stated above (I, 79, 12): but
prudence does not do this for the reason given above. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral
virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by
natural reason. On this they are helped by
prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that
prudence is more excellent than the moral
virtues, and moves them: yet
"synderesis" moves
prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article6