Article 7. Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article7



How many times have you practiced the virtue of justice today for Our Lady?  Your daily examination of conscience would be a good time to think about this.  Remember to specifically ask Mary for help in practicing this virtue each morning when you wake up.

In Christ,
Jared

Article 6. Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (5), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects. However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article6

Article 5. Whether justice is a general virtue?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."  I answer that, Justice, as stated above (Article 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article5

Article 4. Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake." 

The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in I, 81, 2. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (Article 1).

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article4

Seven Ways to Help Spread Devotion to Mary

Below are seven ways you can grow closer to Mary, and help to spread devotion to Her:

1. Start by praying the Rosary.  The Rosary is a powerful prayer that has been handed down through the centuries as a way to ask for Mary's intercession.  The devotion was given to St. Dominic by Mary in 1214.  You can read about it here: http://www.opne.org/rosary.htm.  Also, here is an instruction sheet on how to say it: http://www.newadvent.org/images/rosary.pdf

2.  Wear the Brown Scapular of Our Lady of Mount Carmel.  It was given by Our Lady to St. Simon Stock in 1251.  You can read about it here: http://www.sistersofcarmel.com/brown-scapular-information.php

Any priest can enroll you in the Brown Scapular.  Search for the enrollment prayers online, print them off, and buy a Brown Scapular which will be blessed during the enrollment. 

3. Buy an image of the Immaculate Heart of Mary and place it in your home or apartment. 

4. Read a book about Mary.  There are many good books out there about the Blessed Virgin.  One of my favorites is called "The Glories of Mary", by St. Alphonsus Liguori.  A popular book about consecration to Mary is called "33 Days to Morning Glory."  In this book you can learn about devotion to Mary based on the life of St. Louis De Montfort, St. Maximillian Colbe, Bl. John Paul II, and Bl. Mother Teresa, while preparing to consecrate yourself to Mary.

5. Pray for an increase in devotion to Mary.  Devotion to Mary leads to devotion to Jesus.  She will lead this world to Her Son Jesus!

6. Strive to take on the virtues of the Blessed Virgin.  Good children strive to practice the virtues they learn from their parents.  By practicing Mary's virtues we can help this world to see how She pours out God's grace upon Her children.

7. Lastly, when you have an opportunity to speak about Mary, go for it.  It may be that someone is suffering and needs prayers.  At those times you could mention Our Lady and say that you will ask Her to help, and reassure the suffering person of Mary's intercession.  People want to be reminded of Mary's motherly qualities, and they want to hear about how She loves them. 

Mary Mother of our Creator, Pray for us to Your Son Jesus!

Article 3. Whether justice is a virtue?

Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice.

A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [Ethic. ii, 6, and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article3

Ave Maria!

Let's ask St. Joseph, who is called a just man in Matthew 1:19, to help us practice the virtue of justice!

Article 2. Whether justice is always towards one another?

Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others. 

I answer that, As stated above (Question 57, Article 1) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (57, 1; I-II, 113, 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [Cf. I, 29, 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article2

St. Thomas on Justice - Article 1

Article 1. Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?

I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (2). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others."
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice."

 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article1

Ave Maria!
Let's not be afraid to practice this powerful virtue but instead let us look to Our Lady and St. Joseph and ask them to help us.

Fr. John A. Hardon on Justice

JUSTICE. As a virtue, it is the constant and permanent determination to give everyone his or her rightful due. It is a habitual inclination of the will and therefore always recognizes each one’s rights, under any and all circumstances. The rights in question are whatever belongs to a person as an individual who is distinct from the one who practices justice. The essence of justice, then, as compared with charity, consists in the distinction between a person and his or her neighbor; whereas charity is based on the union existing between the one who loves and the person loved so that the practice of charity regards the neighbor as another self.

http://www.therealpresence.org/cgi-bin/getdefinition.pl

Last Day of Prudence

Praised be Jesus Christ!

Today is the last day for prudence.  Tomorrow we will start on the virtue of justice.  If anyone out there wishes to learn about virtue and to practice it for Our Lady join me!  Let's live as Catholics should, full of zeal for God.  We have the truth.  We have Our Lady.  We have the Sacraments.  Nothing should stop us, not even the gates of Hell!

In Christ,
Jared

Final Article

Article 16. Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."

I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (Article 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Daniel 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Exodus 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article16