Question 125. Fear

1. Is fear a sin?

A human act is a sin if it is disordered, because the good of a human act consists in order. For something to be correctly ordered the appetite (internal inclination) should be subject to reason. Reason says that some things should be avoided and some things sought after. When the appetite avoids what reason says we should not avoid, fear is disordered and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite causes us to avoid what reason tells us to avoid, the appetite is neither disordered or sinful.

2. Is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude?

All fear arises from love. Men only fear losing something they love. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but rightly ordered love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good of his virtue; while disordered love is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is death. This fear unrestrained is opposed to fortitude which regards death. Thus the sin of fear regarding death is said to be opposed to fortitude.

3. Is fear a mortal sin?

Fear is a sin when it is disordered (avoid what reason says shouldn't be avoided). Sometimes this disordered fear only involves the sensitive appetites (passions - tend to objects that are useful or pleasurable), without the consent of the rational appetite (will). In that case it can't be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this disordered fear reaches to the will, and in this case this disordered fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of death or any other temporary evil does what is forbidden by the Divine Law, or omits what is commanded by the Divine Law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

Note: "The Catholic Church by virtue of the commission given to her by Christ is the Divinely constituted interpreter of the Divine Law of both the Old and the New Testament."
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09071a.htm


4. Does fear excuse from sin, or diminishes it?

As stated above, fear is sinful in when it goes against right reason. Reason judges certain evils to be avoided more than others. A sin wouldn't be committed if lesser evils (loss of money) are not avoided so that the bigger evils (death or sins) could be avoided, if done according to reason.

Thus death should be avoided more than the loss of temporal goods. For this reason a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he promised to give something to a robber, yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners when not under fear of death, rather than to good people. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid smaller evils but give in to bigger evils, he couldn't be totally be excused from sin, because that fear would be disordered. 

Evils of the soul (sins) should be feared more than evils of the body (beatings or death). And evils of the body more than evils of external things (loss of money). If one were to incur evils of the soul in order to avoid evils of the body or evils of external things, one would not be totally excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be diminished somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear takes control of a man he feels a need to do a certain thing. Thus Aristotle says that things done through fear are not only voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.


http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3125.htm

Question 124. Martyrdom

1. Is martyrdom an act of virtue?

Virtue helps a man to make good decisions. Good decisions consist in truth, and have justice as their effect. Martyrdom consists in standing firm in truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Thus it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.

2. Is martyrdom an act of fortitude?

An act of fortitude makes a man strong in virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against the dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. It's clear that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in virtue, since he perseveres in faith and justice in spite of the danger of death that is due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Thus St. Cyprian says in a sermon: "The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine."

It is clear that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Catholic Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle." [Hebrews 11:34]


3. Is martyrdom an act of the greatest perfection?

A virtuous act may be considered in comparison with its first motive, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since as St Paul says that "charity...is the bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be greater, according to the degree that he sacrifices for love those things that are most dear to him, or to the degree that his sufferings for love are more painful. But it is clear that of all the goods in this world man loves life itself most, and hates death most, especially when death comes with bodily pains.

Thus it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts, since it is the sign of the greatest charity, according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."


4. Is death essential to martyrdom?

A martyr is called a martyr because he is a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things that are visible for the sake of things that are invisible, as stated in Hebrews 11.  With martyrdom a man shows by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come.  Now so long as a man has a body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body.  For men would rather despise their relatives and all they possess, and even suffer bodily pain, than die.  Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" that is, for the life of his body.  Thus the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.


5. Is faith alone the cause of martyrdom?

Martyrs are called witnesses, because by suffering and dying they bear witness to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ.  Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. The cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.

The truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is shown not only by words, but also by deeds, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my faith." For this reason it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, insofar as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith. Through faith we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Catholic Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for voicing disapproval of adultery.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3124.htm

Love her

Men,

If God has placed a woman in your life then He has greatly blessed you and has also given you a great responsibility. You are to love that woman as Christ loves the Church. 

Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and delivered himself up for it:
     - Ephesians 5:25

Think about how much Christ loves the Church, and think about how much he wants you to love your wife.

 Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.
     - John 15:13

Our Lord will help you to love the woman He has placed in your life as you should.  May you always trust in our Lord and grow closer to Him, and may your strength and love will be founded upon the strength and love of Our Lord. 

Thank you for serving Our Lord and Our Lady.

Fortitude of Itself: The virtue of fortitude (123) - Part 2

7. Is it's action directed to it's own good?

There are two ends: proximate and ultimate.

1) Proximate end - introducing likeness into something else, ex: heat into wood, prudence into human deeds.

2) Ultimate end: whatever good occurs as result of proximate end.

Thus, a man with fortitude intends as his proximate end to reproduce a likeness of fortitude, because he wants to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.


8. Does it take pleasure in its own action?

There are two parts to pleasure:

1) Bodily - resulting from bodily contact
2) Spiritual - results from deeds of virtue

The primary act of fortitude is to endure things that are unpleasant to the body and soul. The brave man (possessing the virtue of fortitude) receives spiritual pleasure in the act of virtue itself and the end of virtue, but on the other hand he has spiritual sorrow and bodily pain.

The virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. Also, the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, insofar as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and what concerns it.


9. Does fortitude deal chiefly with sudden occurrences?

There are two things that must be considered in the operation of fortitude:

1) As a choice - In this way it is not about sudden occurrences because a man thinks beforehand of dangers that may come and he prepares himself, to bear them more easily.

2) As a virtuous habit - In this way fortitude is about sudden dangers since a habit works by way of a person's nature. If a person without forethought acts virtuously in danger this is proof that habitual fortitude is in that person.

Yet it's possible for a person who doesn't have the habit of fortitude to prepare against danger by long preparation in the same way a brave man with fortitude prepares himself suddenly when necessary.


Article 10. Does it make use of anger in its action?

Concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics.

1) Stoics - excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man. They gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason separated them altogether from virtue.

2)Peripatetics - of whom Aristotle was the chief, held that virtuous persons should use both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the control of reason.

The brave man employs reasonable anger for his action, but not excessive anger.


11. Is it a cardinal virtue?

The primary or cardinal virtues are those which contain parts that belong to the virtues in common. A common condition of other virtues is to act steadfastly, and fortitude above all other virtues involves steadfastness.

In addition, man shuns pain more than he desires pleasure. Those pains feared the most lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.


12. Its comparison with the other cardinal virtues 

Prudence has the perfection of right reason. Justice leads to right reason, since the purpose of justice is to establish right reason in human affairs. The other virtues safeguard right reason when they moderate the passions. Fortitude is first after prudence and justice because fear of death has the greatest power to make men turn away from right reason. Thus the order among the cardinal virtues is prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3123.htm

Fortitude of Itself: The virtue of fortitude (123) - Part 1

Praised be Jesus Christ!  I have taken the main body of the first 6 articles of "Fortitude of Itself" and summarized each one in easy to understand language below.  I am a simple lay man and don't have a theology degree, so keep that in mind.  Hopefully my translation is correct.  If you are interested in reading the articles yourself I have placed the link at the bottom of the post. 

Please join me in learning about and practicing virtue for our Queen on Her glorious feast of the Immaculate Conception.  For Mary!


1. Is fortitude a virtue?

Virtue makes the person and his works good.  Man's good according to Dionysius (member of Greek council, was converted by St. Paul in Acts 17:34) is to be in accordance with reason. 

Human virtue makes man good, it makes his work in accord with right reason by three ways:
1. By making his reason correct by itself, through the intellectual virtues.
2. By making his reason correct in human affairs through the virtue of justice.
3. By removing all obstacles to reason being correct in human affairs.
     a) Obstacle 1 - object of pleasure other than what right reason requires - removed by temperance
     b) Obstacle 2 - not wanting to follow correct reason because of difficulty - removed by fortitude

Thus fortitude is a virtue because it helps man follow right reason.


2. Is fortitude a special virtue?

Fortitude can be understood in 2 ways:
1. Firmness of mind - in this sense it is a general virtue (condition of every virtue).
2. Firmness only in doing things that are very difficult to be firm (grave dangers), in this sense it is regarded as a special virtue.


3. Is fortitude about fear and daring?

Fortitude removes any obstacle that doesn't allow the will to follow reason.  Fortitude is about restraining fear and moderating daring.


4. Is fortitude only about danger of death?

As previously stated it belongs to fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil.  Fortitude of soul binds the will firmly to the good of reason in the face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will stand firm against lesser things, but not conversely.  It belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it takes away all bodily goods.  Thus the virtue of fortitude is about the dangers of death.


5. Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?

As stated above fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger which is death.  Fortitude is a virtue, and virtue tends toward good.  When man is close to death in situations outside of battle (storms, sickness, attacks from robbers, etc.) this doesn't come from pursuing some good, on the other hand, dangers of death in battle come to man because he is defending the common good by a just fight. 

There are two kinds of a just fight:
1) General combat - war
2) Private combat  - when a judge or individual gives a just judgment even though he may be killed because of it

Further, A brave man behaves well in face of any other kind of death; especially since a man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of his practicing virtue.  Such as visiting a sick friend who has a deadly infection, or not refusing to undertake a journey for a good reason through fear of shipwreck or robbers.


6. Is endurance is the chief act of fortitude?

Fortitude is more about calming fears rather than moderating daring.  It is more difficult to calm fear, since danger itself checks daring and increases fear.  To attack belongs to fortitude only in so far as daring is moderated during the attack.  Thus the primary act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.


http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3123.htm

Definition of Fortitude and 35 Ways to Grow in it

From the Modern Catholic Dictionary by Fr. John Hardon:

 

FORTITUDE. Firmness of spirit. As a virtue, it is a steadiness of will in doing good in spite of difficulties faced in the performance of one’s duty.
 

There are two levels to the practice of fortitude: one is the suppression of inordinate fear and the other is the curbing of recklessness. The control of fear is the main role of fortitude. Hence the primary effect of fortitude is to keep unreasonable fears under control and not allow them to prevent one from doing what one’s mind says should be done. But fortitude or courage also moderates rashness, which tends to lead the headstrong to excess in the face of difficulties and dangers. It is the special virtue of pioneers in any endeavor.

As a human virtue, fortitude is essentially different from what has come to be called animal courage. Animals attack either from pain, as when they are wounded, or from fear of pain, as when they go after humans because they are angered, whom they would leave alone if they were unmolested. They are not virtuously brave, for they face danger from pain or rage or some other sense instinct, not from choice, as do those who act with foresight. True courage is from deliberate choice, not mere emotion. (Etym. Latin fortitudo, strength; firmness of soul; courage of soul.)

 http://www.therealpresence.org/cgi-bin/getdefinition.pl

 

To get us started in keeping track of points for our conquest game, below I completed a list of things we could do in our daily lives that might help us to grow in fortitude.  I'm sure you will think of other things you could do as well.  We should always keep in mind that any strength we have comes from God, not ourselves.  Since fortitude is one of the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, we should ask for growth in this glorious virtue.

 

1. To continue on a project you have been given that is not going well, or that you don't like.

2. To get out of bed at the first sound of your alarm when you want to keep sleeping.

3. To go to bed before it gets late at night, even though you would like to continue surfing the internet.

4. To not complain or try to get out of a difficult project.

5. To finish a project on time even when it requires extra focus and dedication.

6. To finish what you start.

7. To learn a new skill that will help you perform better at your job.

8. To follow the teachings of the Catholic Church, even when it's tough, and others stand in your way.

9. To respond with true charity and meekness when ridiculed by others.

10. To stand for truth when it might cost you.

11. To defend someone else even though it may hurt how you look in others' eyes.

12. To have the courage to look at your own shortcomings when you are tempted to be critical of others.

13. To smile and say hi to those you don't want to smile at.

14. To spend time with those you find difficult, while trying to see Christ in them.

15. To help someone with something when you don't want to help them.

16. To resist the urge to treat others disrespectfully. 

17. To resist the urge to participate in gossip.

18. To resist despair or thoughts that may cause you to give up what you should continue.

19. To resist the temptation to worry about things.

20. To resist the urge to become angry at someone

21. To overcome the fear of going to confession.

22. To overcome the fear of seeking counsel.

23. To overcome the fear the fear of being incompetent.

24. To do or learn something new, knowing that it will take you out of your comfort zone.

25. To make short prayers of trust when you are lacking in trust or doubting our Lord's help.

26. To see your crosses as blessings and to thank the Lord for them, uniting them to His cross for the salvation of souls.

27. To fight against temptations from the devil.

28. To say your daily prayers and to spend time in mental prayer even when you don't feel like it.

29. To resist the urge to stop doing something that is tough, when you know it is God's will for you.

30. To keep promises, commitments, and resolutions you have made, and to resist any temptations to back out.

31. To fight against any type of evil in the world knowing the cross will come because of it.

32. To make a prayer of resignation to God's will when you are enduring any kind of suffering.

33. To continue to make acts of love in mental prayer even though you are experiencing dryness.

34. To resist temptations to stop mental prayer early or allow your mind to wander during mental prayer.

35. To ask God or His saints to help you to grow in fortitude.

 Death of Judas Maccabeus by José Teófilo de Jesus (1758–1847) 

 

2 Machabees 6:31
Thus did this man die, leaving not only to young men, but also to the whole nation, the memory of his death for an example of virtue and fortitude. 

 

 

Fortitude

 The virtue that we will focus on for the next 52 days will be fortitude. This is such a manly virtue, and one that is needed so much in our modern times. The women in our lives are counting on us to be strong in this virtue. How many men today find themselves wandering aimlessly in life, unable to keep their word, unable to persevere in a path God has set them on? It is effeminate to quit something once it is started, that is clearly in God's will. How the devil loves to attack us men here. He wants to disturb the waters of our soul, to cause us to doubt the help of Our Lord, and then to bail. To give up and listen to the devil only increases our insecurity and fear, while hurting Our relationship with God.

Our Queen Mary, is calling us men to grow in fortitude which is built upon the strength of Jesus Christ. Our Lord has a strong, fatherly heart and he is willing to help us become the men he is calling us to be. We are called to be strong men, willing to carry our cross. True peace will come when we stop worrying, complaining, and looking for an excuse to drop the cross and walk away. True peace will come at that moment when, despite feeling the full weight of the cross, we pull our faces out of the mud to see Our Immaculate Queen, and continue on by resigning ourselves with love to God's will.

Luke 9:23
And he said to all: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me.
 

  

The glorious St. Michael will be our patron for the virtue of fortitude. Since this virtue is one used in battle he will be the perfect patron since he fights demons, and will defend us when we call upon him and ask him to help us grow in this virtue.

While focusing on the virtue of fortitude we should pray the prayer of St. Michael in Latin or English each day, asking St. Michael to help us to grow in this virtue.
 

Sancte Michael Archangele, defende nos in proelio; contra nequitiam et insidias diaboli esto praesidium. Imperat illi Deus; supplices deprecamur: tuque, Princeps militiae coelestis, Satanam aliosque spiritus malignos, qui ad perditionem animarum pervagantur in mundo, divina virtute in infernum detrude. Amen 

 

Saint Michael the Archangel, defend us in the battle, be our protection against the wickedness and snares of the devil; may God rebuke him, we humbly pray; and do thou, O Prince of the heavenly host, by the power of God, thrust into hell Satan and all the other evil spirits who prowl about the world seeking the ruin of souls. Amen.

Daniel 12:1
But at that time shall Michael rise up, the great prince, who standeth for the children of thy people: and a time shall come such as never was from the time that nations began even until that time. And at that time shall thy people be saved, every one that shall be found written in the book.

Speculum Justitiae

Ecclesiasticus 43:35
Who shall see him, and declare him? And who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning?

Luke 1:46-55
And Mary said: My soul doth magnify the Lord. And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour. Because he hath regarded the humility of his handmaid; for behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed. Because he that is mighty, hath done great things to me; and holy is his name. And his mercy is from generation unto generations, to them that fear him. He hath shewed might in his arm: he hath scattered the proud in the conceit of their heart. He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble. He hath filled the hungry with good things; and the rich he hath sent empty away. He hath received Israel his servant, being mindful of his mercy: As he spoke to our fathers, to Abraham and to his seed for ever.

The Mirror of Justice, by Blessed Cardinal John Henry Newman

Here first we must consider what is meant by justice, for the word as used by the Church has not that sense which it bears in ordinary English. By "justice" is not meant the virtue of fairness, equity, uprightness in our dealings; but it is a word denoting all virtues at once, a perfect, virtuous state of soul, righteousness, or moral perfection; so that it answers very nearly to what is meant by sanctity. Therefore when our Lady is called the "Mirror of Justice," it is meant to say that she is the Mirror of sanctity, holiness, supernatural goodness.

Next, what is meant by calling her a mirror? A mirror is a surface which reflects, as still water, polished steel, or a looking glass. What did Mary reflect? She reflected our Lord but He is infinite Sanctity. She then, as far as a creature could, reflected His Divine sanctity, and therefore she is the Mirror of Sanctity, or, as the Litany says, of Justice.

Do we ask how she came to reflect His Sanctity? It was by living with Him. We see every day how like people get to each other who live with those they love. When they live with those whom they don't love, as, for instance, the members of a family who quarrel with each other, then the longer they live together the more unlike each other they become; but when they love each other, as husband and wife, parents and children, brothers with brothers or sisters, friends with friends, then in course of time they get surprisingly like each other. All of us perceive this; we are witnesses to it with our own eyes and ears; in the expression of their features, in their voice, in their walk, in their language, even in their handwriting, they become like each other and so with regard to their minds, as in their opinions, their tastes, their pursuits. And again doubtless in the state of their souls, which we do not see, whether for good or for bad.

Now, consider that Mary loved her Divine Son with an unutterable love; and consider too she had Him all to herself for thirty years. Do we not see that, as she was full of grace before she conceived Him in her womb, she must have had a vast incomprehensible sanctity when she had lived close to God for thirty years? A sanctity of an angelical order, reflecting back the attributes of God with a fullness and exactness of which no saint upon earth, or hermit, or holy virgin, can even remind us. Truly then she is the Speculum Justitiae, the Mirror of Divine Perfection.

Article 12. Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

Objection 1.  Justice isn't first among the moral virtues because justice is about giving to each his due, but generosity is giving to others what we have, which is more virtuous. 

Objection 2.  Aristotle says that magnanimity (greatness of mind and heart) includes justice and all the virtues.  Therefore magnanimity is greater than justice.

Objection 3.  Aristotle says that virtue is about things that are difficult and good, and fortitude is about more difficult things than justice.

On the contrary, Cicero says justice is the most impressive of the virtues.

It is clear that legal justice (justice that directs man toward the common good) is first among the moral virtues since it involves multiple people, rather than just one.  In addition, particular justice (directed to just one person) is also first among the moral virtues for two reasons.  The first is that justice is in the will, which is the higher part of the soul while the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, which is the lower part of the soul.  The second is that Aristotle says that the greatest virtues are those which help others, since virtue is about doing good to others.  Aristotle goes on to say that greatest honors are given to the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in war and in peace.

Reply to Objection 1.  A generous man gives while thinking about his own growth in virtue, while a just man gives to another his due, while thinking about the common good.  Justice is directed to everyone, but generosity can't extend to everyone.  Also generosity is based on justice.

Reply to Objection 2.  When magnanimity (greatness of mind and heart) is added to justice it increases the good of justice, but without justice it wouldn't even be a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3.  Fortitude is about the most difficult things, but is only useful in warfare.  Justice is useful in both war and in peace.

www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article12


Praised be Jesus Christ!

This article definitely should motivate us to practice acts of justice since it states clearly that this virtue is the first among all moral virtues.  We have until Wednesday of next week to focus on this glorious virtue.  Let's finish strong.

FOR MARY!

Article 11. Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

Praised be Jesus Christ!

I am going to attempt to explain what I think St. Thomas is saying in these articles in very simple terms. I am not qualified for this, so keep that in mind when you are reading. I will most likely make some mistakes, and if I can't figure out what he is saying I may have to just skip that sentence, section, or even the whole article.  I will try this out and see how it goes.  Below is my first attempt at this.

In the Immaculate Heart,
Jared


Objection 1:
Justice is not to render to each person their own because St. Augustine says giving to the poor would be an act of justice. When you give to the poor you are giving what is not theirs. Therefore justice is not to render to each one his own.

Objection 2:
Tully (Also known as Cicero 106–43 b.c, Roman philosopher) says that generosity is a form of justice. When we are generous we give to others what doesn't belong to them, therefore justice is not to render to each one his own.

Objection 3:
Justice is not only about giving out material things but also repressing bad actions such as adultery, or murder. Rendering to each his due seems to describe the giving out of material things, so to render to each one his own is not a good way to describe an act of justice.

On the contrary, St. Ambrose says that justice gives to each his due.

I answer that, Each mans own is that which is due to him.  Strictly speaking justice is nothing else than to give to each his due.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice is a cardinal virtue so other secondary virtues, such as mercy, and generosity are connected to it.  

This suffices for Objection 2

Reply to Objection 3: Aristotle says that when speaking about justice "profit" is used for what is excessive and what is deficient is called "loss." Justice is commonly used when speaking about buying and selling, where the expressions "profit" and "loss" fit well, yet they are transferred by Aristotle to all other matters involving justice. Thus we can use "to render to each one his own" when describing justice.

Original article found at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article11

Virtues/Vices Quick Guide

This is something I put together for the 8th grade religion class that I teach.

Virtue - Good habit
Mnemonic for Cardinal Virtues: PJFT (Peanut-butter, Jelly, French, Toast)

Wisdom Chapter 8:7
P -> Prudence - making good decisions
J -> Justice - giving to each his due
F -> Fortitude - perseverance, strength
T -> Temperance - restraint in temptation or desire

1 Cor. 13:13
Theological Virtues: Faith, Hope, Charity
Faith - The acceptance of the word of another, trusting that one knows what the other is saying and is honest in telling the truth.
Hope - The confident desire of obtaining a future good that is difficult to attain.
Charity - The infused supernatural virtue by which a person loves God above all things for his own sake, and loves others for God's sake.
    - Servant of God Fr. John Hardon S.J., Modern Catholic Dictionary

Vice - Bad habit
Deadly Sins - Another name for the seven capital sins. They may be called deadly because they are tendencies to those basic sins which, if deliberately and fully consented to, deprive a person of the supernatural life of God in the soul.
    - Servant of God Fr. John Hardon S.J., Modern Catholic Dictionary

Galatians 5:19-21
1 Corinthians 6:10
Mnemonic for Seven Deadly/Capital Sins: PALE GAS
P -> Pride - high opinion of oneself, desire to be considered as better than one is
A -> Anger - emotional sense of displeasure
L -> Lust - desire for sexual pleasure outside of God's purposes for it within marriage
E -> Envy - sadness or discontent because of another person's success
G -> Gluttony - eating or drinking an excessive amount
A -> Avarice - extreme desire for material things
S -> Sloth - laziness

Note: I first heard about these mnemonics from Dr. Taylor Marshall.  He has a great blog at http://taylormarshall.com/, and I suggest that you check his blog out.

Article 10. Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that it is the real mean.

I answer that, As stated above (09; I-II, 59, 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard. On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article10

Article 9. Whether justice is about the passions?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.

The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (I-II, 22, 3; I-II, 59, 4), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on the part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article9


Praised be Jesus Christ!  Fellow Knights of the Immaculate Queen.  Let us all beg of St. Mary the virtue of justice.  Let us start by showing our friends, family, and superiors the love and respect that they deserve.  We should make it a point to be at work on time, and to put in an honest days work for our employer.  We should in charity correct those God has given us care over when they are in need of correction, and let us give God His due by setting time aside for prayer each day.  Let us remember to thank Him for all that we have been given. 

Mary, Queen of All Hearts, take possession of the hearts of all men!

Article 8. Whether particular justice has a special matter?

The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article8

Article 7. Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article7



How many times have you practiced the virtue of justice today for Our Lady?  Your daily examination of conscience would be a good time to think about this.  Remember to specifically ask Mary for help in practicing this virtue each morning when you wake up.

In Christ,
Jared

Article 6. Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (5), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects. However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article6

Article 5. Whether justice is a general virtue?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."  I answer that, Justice, as stated above (Article 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article5

Article 4. Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake." 

The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in I, 81, 2. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (Article 1).

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article4

Seven Ways to Help Spread Devotion to Mary

Below are seven ways you can grow closer to Mary, and help to spread devotion to Her:

1. Start by praying the Rosary.  The Rosary is a powerful prayer that has been handed down through the centuries as a way to ask for Mary's intercession.  The devotion was given to St. Dominic by Mary in 1214.  You can read about it here: http://www.opne.org/rosary.htm.  Also, here is an instruction sheet on how to say it: http://www.newadvent.org/images/rosary.pdf

2.  Wear the Brown Scapular of Our Lady of Mount Carmel.  It was given by Our Lady to St. Simon Stock in 1251.  You can read about it here: http://www.sistersofcarmel.com/brown-scapular-information.php

Any priest can enroll you in the Brown Scapular.  Search for the enrollment prayers online, print them off, and buy a Brown Scapular which will be blessed during the enrollment. 

3. Buy an image of the Immaculate Heart of Mary and place it in your home or apartment. 

4. Read a book about Mary.  There are many good books out there about the Blessed Virgin.  One of my favorites is called "The Glories of Mary", by St. Alphonsus Liguori.  A popular book about consecration to Mary is called "33 Days to Morning Glory."  In this book you can learn about devotion to Mary based on the life of St. Louis De Montfort, St. Maximillian Colbe, Bl. John Paul II, and Bl. Mother Teresa, while preparing to consecrate yourself to Mary.

5. Pray for an increase in devotion to Mary.  Devotion to Mary leads to devotion to Jesus.  She will lead this world to Her Son Jesus!

6. Strive to take on the virtues of the Blessed Virgin.  Good children strive to practice the virtues they learn from their parents.  By practicing Mary's virtues we can help this world to see how She pours out God's grace upon Her children.

7. Lastly, when you have an opportunity to speak about Mary, go for it.  It may be that someone is suffering and needs prayers.  At those times you could mention Our Lady and say that you will ask Her to help, and reassure the suffering person of Mary's intercession.  People want to be reminded of Mary's motherly qualities, and they want to hear about how She loves them. 

Mary Mother of our Creator, Pray for us to Your Son Jesus!

Article 3. Whether justice is a virtue?

Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice.

A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [Ethic. ii, 6, and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article3

Ave Maria!

Let's ask St. Joseph, who is called a just man in Matthew 1:19, to help us practice the virtue of justice!

Article 2. Whether justice is always towards one another?

Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others. 

I answer that, As stated above (Question 57, Article 1) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (57, 1; I-II, 113, 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [Cf. I, 29, 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article2

St. Thomas on Justice - Article 1

Article 1. Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?

I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (2). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others."
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice."

 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3058.htm#article1

Ave Maria!
Let's not be afraid to practice this powerful virtue but instead let us look to Our Lady and St. Joseph and ask them to help us.

Fr. John A. Hardon on Justice

JUSTICE. As a virtue, it is the constant and permanent determination to give everyone his or her rightful due. It is a habitual inclination of the will and therefore always recognizes each one’s rights, under any and all circumstances. The rights in question are whatever belongs to a person as an individual who is distinct from the one who practices justice. The essence of justice, then, as compared with charity, consists in the distinction between a person and his or her neighbor; whereas charity is based on the union existing between the one who loves and the person loved so that the practice of charity regards the neighbor as another self.

http://www.therealpresence.org/cgi-bin/getdefinition.pl

Last Day of Prudence

Praised be Jesus Christ!

Today is the last day for prudence.  Tomorrow we will start on the virtue of justice.  If anyone out there wishes to learn about virtue and to practice it for Our Lady join me!  Let's live as Catholics should, full of zeal for God.  We have the truth.  We have Our Lady.  We have the Sacraments.  Nothing should stop us, not even the gates of Hell!

In Christ,
Jared

Final Article

Article 16. Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."

I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (Article 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Daniel 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Exodus 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article16

 

Prudence - Article 15

Article 15. Whether prudence is in us by nature?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience. 

I answer that, As shown above (Article 3), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above (Article 6): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (I-II, 51, 1; I-II, 63, 1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above (6; I-II, 57, 5), it follows that prudence is not from nature.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article15

Prudence - Article 14

Article 14. Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (Article 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article14

Prudence - Article 13

Article 13. Whether prudence can be in sinners?

The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no sinner is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh. The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command. The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article13

Prudence - Article 12

Article 12. Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects.

I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article12

Prudence - Article 11

Article 11. Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that which extends to the common good?

"Political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

I answer that, As stated above (5; 54, 2, ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (I-II, Prolog.; I-II, 102, 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article11

Prudence - Article 10

Whether prudence extends to the governing of many? 


Our Lord said (Matthew 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?"

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Corinthians 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Corinthians 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual.
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.


http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article10

Prudence - Article 9

Article 9. Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

It is written (1 Peter 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.

I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel."


http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article9

 

Prudence - Article 8

Article 8. Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

 

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands."

I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II, 14, 1). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3047.htm#article8

Prudence - Article 7

Article 7. Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above (Article 6). Therefore it does not find the mean in them. Objection 2. Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above (5, Objection 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues. Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues. On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (5, Objection 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . even as a wise man decides." I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act according to reason. But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply to Objection 2. Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue. Reply to Objection 3. Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.

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Prudence - Article 6

Article 6. Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?

Objection 1. It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues. Objection 2. Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues. Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason. Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; I-II, 13, 3); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, 79, 12): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. On this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.

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Prudence - Article 5

Article 5. Whether prudence is a special virtue?

It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written (Wisdom 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude."

I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 2; I-II, 54, 2), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, 54, 2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above (I-II, 54, 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits. Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above (Article 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and "understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (I-II, 57, 4). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

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Prudence - Article 4

Article 4. Whether prudence is a virtue?

Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 55, 3; I-II, 56, 1) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good. Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (1, ad 3; 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.

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Prudence - Article 3

Article 3. Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also."

I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

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Prudence - Article 2

Article 2. Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

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